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(RE)CALIBRATION, STANDARD-SETTING 
AND THE SHAPING OF INVESTMENT LAW 
AND ARBITRATION 
ERIC DE BRABANDERE* 
Abstract: Calibrating or (re)calibrating investment law and arbitration—de-
pending on whether the exercise takes place for the first or a subsequent time—
is different from rebalancing investment law and arbitration. A balancing exer-
cise denotes a situation in which different elements are equal or in the correct 
proportions to maintain a sort of equilibrium. This Essay argues that investment 
law and arbitration are not necessarily about creating a situation in which all 
“elements” are in balance and that (re)calibrating is an interesting starting point 
for a discussion about the contemporary regime of investment law and arbitra-
tion, and especially to explore, understand, or visualize the current and future 
developments in the field. The central questions in this Essay include determin-
ing what the standards are and who sets them. This Essay examines (re)calib-
ration and looks at the process from the vantage point of the standards which are 
used for such (re)calibration and evaluates how the standards have evolved sub-
stantially over the years and how new treaties—in an exercise of (re)calibra-
tion—are in fact following or adapting to these new standards.   
INTRODUCTION—(RE)CALIBRATION AND THE  
INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 
Calibrating or (re)calibrating investment law and arbitration—depen-
ding on whether the exercise takes place for the first or a subsequent time—
is different from rebalancing investment law and arbitration. A balancing 
exercise denotes a situation in which different elements are equal or in the 
correct proportions to maintain a sort of equilibrium. Investment law and 
arbitration—with the exception perhaps of certain elements of arbitral pro-
cedure—are not always about creating situations in which all elements, such 
as investor protection, investor obligation, or even the host State and the 
foreign investor, are equal. A balancing exercise within certain specific are-
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as of investment law is not per se unnecessary or useless. The idea of find-
ing ways to include investor obligations in investment, by finding an equi-
librium between the rights and obligations of States’ treaties, or balancing 
the various interests at stake in international investment law, are useful ex-
ercises and analytical angles to look at investment law and arbitration. 
Nevertheless, investment law and arbitration are not necessarily about 
creating a situation in which all “elements” are in balance. From that per-
spective, when one seeks to analyse how international investment law and 
arbitration are currently regulated and shaped, the idea of “balance” as an 
evaluative device is limited. (Re)calibrating is an interesting starting point 
for a discussion about the contemporary regime of investment law and arbi-
tration, and especially to explore, understand, or visualise the current and 
future developments in the field. 
Calibration forms part of “metrology” or the “science and practice of 
measurement” and implies the comparison of the values obtained by a 
measuring instrument with those of a standard, which usually is a known 
internationally or nationally set standard.1 Calibration, at least in its metro-
logical sense, is a rather neutral act in that it merely denotes the measure-
ment/comparison act and does not comprise any adjustment on the meas-
urement so obtained, which is termed verification and validation.2 The 
whole idea behind calibration is to reset the measured device in accordance 
with the results of the measurement. This all may seem very protracted, yet 
it denotes the objective of this Essay, which is to enquire how one measures 
or (re)calibrates investment law and arbitration, or, in other words, by which 
standards, modifications, and adjustments to international investment law 
and arbitration are being made or suggested, and by which standards can 
international investment law and arbitration be evaluated. The end objective 
is to provide critical insights into how standards are (re)set in international 
investment law and arbitration, and thus how this system is shaped. 
This enquiry is important in the current debate on investment law, in 
which both opponents, proponents, and scholars, are constantly making 
claims about how investment law should be.3 The enquiry is also important 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See JOINT COMM. FOR GUIDES IN METROLOGY, INTERNATIONAL VOCABULARY OF METROL-
OGY—BASIC AND GENERAL CONCEPTS AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 1, 28 (3rd ed., 2012), https://
www.bipm.org/utils/common/documents/jcgm/JCGM_200_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6WW-
WJ9U] [hereinafter JOINT COMM. FOR GUIDES IN METROLOGY] (explaining that this vocabulary is 
for “common reference” of terms in metrology, and defining “calibration”). 
 2 See id. at 31 (providing a definition for “verification,” “validation,” and “metrological com-
parability of measurement results”). 
 3 See Barnali Choudhury, Exception Provisions as a Gateway to Incorporating Human Rights 
Issues into International Investment Agreements, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 670, 670 (2011) 
(explaining the claim that “international investment law should be reconceptualized in order to 
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because modifications to investment law norms are very often justified or 
legitimized based on the fact that there is an international standard that ac-
tually dictates the modification/calibration. 
The central question then is what the standard is and by whom it is set. 
A purely legalistic system–internal perspective would start with an enquiry 
about the traditional sources of international investment law, to see whether 
these contain any standards by which one could (re)calibrate the currents 
norms and rules in international investment law most often contained in 
investment treaties. Customary international law—while of importance in 
relation to certain aspects of investment law and arbitration4—provides 
some guidance in terms of standard setting, but one finds remarkably very 
little references to “objective” standards such as those found in customary 
law.5  This is probably due not only to the vagueness of custom in this area, 
but also the criticism on the formation of customary international invest-
ment law, which has targeted the Western dominance in setting customary 
protection standards and the role of arbitral tribunals in deciding—right or 
wrong—what customary international investment law is.6 The same goes 
for general principles of international law.7 
This leaves us mainly with international treaty law. But treaties pre-
cisely compose the regime governing international investment law and arbi-
tration,8 which is the subject of the “measurement act.”9 This implies that 
States set the norms in international investment law, and that these norms 
may at the same time be considered the standards by which investment law 
can be tested against. This legal circularity is inevitable, but of course not 
helpful in the present enquiry. Moreover, the norms contained in treaties are 
inevitably variable and fluctuate. The fluctuation takes place over time and 
                                                                                                                           
realize both the economic and social aspects of foreign investment”) (emphasis added); Veijo 
Heiskanen, The Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation in Light of the Practice of the Iran–United 
States Claims Tribunal, 8 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 215, 216 (2007) (“[I]nvestment law should 
aim at least at a minimum, if not optimum, level of predictability.”). 
 4 See generally Jean d’Aspremont, Customary International Investment Law: Story of a Par-
adox, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: SOURCES OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 5–47 (Eric 
De Brabandere & Tarcisio Gazzini eds., 2012) (discussing the evolution of customary internation-
al law) [hereinafter SOURCES OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS]. 
 5 The only exception perhaps is reference to international law in certain protection standards 
such as fair and equitable treatment, which I will discuss in more detail later. 
 6 See id. at 5–47 (providing an overview of customary international law). 
 7 See Stephan W. Schill, General Principles of Law and International Investment Law, in 
SOURCES OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, supra note 4, at 133 (explaining the general principles of 
international law). 
 8 See generally JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 44 (2009) 
(providing an overview of international treaty and arbitration law). 
 9 See JOINT COMM. FOR GUIDES IN METROLOGY, supra note 1, at 30–31 (providing defini-
tions for measuring standards). 
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in accordance with geographical and political preferences.10 I acknowledge 
that investment treaties are drafted, and re-drafted, to conform to the stand-
ards contained in other treaties because these are considered to be the 
“standards” of international investment law. This Essay then investigates 
how recent modifications to investment law and arbitrations norms have 
been made and justified outside of the standards set by other treaties, either 
by reference to internal or external standards. 
There are indeed standards that are being used to justify, legitimize, or 
explain modifications to the investment law regime. These standards are also 
used to evaluate the regime in the sense of measuring the extent to which the 
contemporary investment law and arbitration regimes meet certain stand-
ards—the internationally accepted metrological value of what investment law 
norms should be. (Re)calibration has taken place over the past years on vari-
ous grounds, and is based on the consideration that adjustments have been 
necessary to conform to these standards. This has been the case based on (1) 
the standards set in customary international investment law, and (2) norms, 
rules, principles, and practices originating from non-investment law regimes 
within public international law. Beyond these two legal standards, there is a 
third “standard”: the political, economic and policy standards outside of any 
legal constraints. These are inherent in the nature of international investment 
law that is largely treaty-based and open to a voluntarist approach to setting 
the contents of investment treaties. Setting investment protection standards is 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Treaties moreover are not necessarily subjected to any form of consistency when viewed from 
the perspective of one state. While those states that have developed model investment agreements 
very often (try to) stick to their model in treaty negotiations, this is not always tenable. One sees 
variations in treaties signed between a state having a model BIT and other states. Compare Agree-
ment Between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and the Republic of Columbia on the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, BLEU-Colom., art. VIII, Feb. 4, 2009, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/342 [https://perma.cc/W5HQ-UPL9] 
(containing extensive provisions on labour standards), with Agreement Between the Belgium-
Luxembourg Economic Union and the Sultanate of Oman on the Promotion and Reciprocal Pro-
tection of Investments, BLEU-Oman, art. 5, Dec. 16, 2008, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/397 [https://perma.cc/KT8P-KEDZ] (containing a different provision on la-
bour). The Belgium–Luxembourg Economic Union, however, has a Model BIT from 2002 which 
contains different provisions. See Belgium–Luxemburg Economic Union Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty, 2002, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2831 [https://perma.cc/
P5A4-9GGC] [hereinafter BLEU Model Agreement] (containing a different labour provision); see 
also Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Lise Johnson, Belgium’s Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty: A Review (Mar. 2010), https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/belgiums_
model_bit.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4HR-S76V] (providing further discussion on the BLEU Model 
Agreement). Some authors, however, have considered that the web of investment treaties has 
resulted in a multilateralization of investment law and arbitration. See generally STEPHAN W. 
SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2009) (exploring 
the relationship between investment treaties and the multilateralization of international investment 
law). 
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an inherently political conversation, as a consequence of the voluntarist reali-
ty of standard-setting in treaties.11 From that perspective, there is no manda-
tory standard for norms in investment law and arbitration and expectations or 
judgements that one may have—as scholars, practitioners, civil society, or 
policy makers—as to whether, for example, a certain investor protection trea-
ty norm is “right” or “wrong” is inhibited by a biased and pre-determined 
idea of what that standard is or should be. 
My intention is not to make any strong normative propositions as to 
whether the (re)calibration exercises in general, or in relation to the specific 
issues discussed here are “right” or “wrong.” Instead this Essay examines 
(re)calibration, and looks at the process from the vantage point of the stand-
ards which are used for such (re)calibration and evaluates how the standards 
have evolved substantially over the years, and how new treaties—in an ex-
ercise of (re)calibration—are in fact following or adapting to these new 
standards. Part I of this Essay addresses the genealogy and rational of in-
vestment treaties and their standards.12 Part II examines the recent redefini-
tions of investment protection standards such as fair and equitable treatment 
(“FET”).13 Part III of this Essay situates FET in relation to questions regard-
ing the obligations of foreign investors.14 Part IV then evaluates the evolu-
tion and transparency in investment treaty arbitration.15 
I. THE GENEALOGY AND STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 
The most remarkable evolution in the field of international investment 
law was the massive proliferation of Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”), 
multilateral investment treaties, and other trade–related treaties that contain 
investment protection provisions such as Preferential Trade Agreements 
(“PTAs”) or Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”). The United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) estimates the number of 
BITs at 2,952—of which 2,358 are in force—and some 380 other treaties 
                                                                                                                           
 11 The use of the term “voluntarism” in this context merely denotes the idea that States are in 
relative absolute liberty to decide and agree on the contents of international investment treaties. 
My use of the term voluntarism does not imply any take on the normative aspects of the debate or 
on the origin of the norms contained in the treaties. See generally Alain Pellet, The Normative 
Dilemma: Will and Consent in International Law-Making, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 22 (1992) 
(providing an overview of the discussion surrounding the voluntarist approach to treaties); Fer-
nando R. Teson, International Obligation and the Theory of Hypothetical Consent, 15 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 84 (1990) (discussing the voluntarist approach to treaties and the normative aspects of the 
debate). 
 12 See infra notes 16–46 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 47–79 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 80–95 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 96–116 and accompanying text. 
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which contain investment protection provisions—of which 310 are in 
force.16 For the sake of simplicity, I will use here the notion of international 
investment agreement (“IIA”) to denote those treaties that contain invest-
ment protection clauses aimed at promoting and protecting foreign investors 
and their investments. 
IIAs are not homogenous categories of treaties containing exactly the 
same provisions. It is therefore difficult and risky to generalize about these 
two types of treaties. Similarly, there are many differences between con-
temporary IIAs and earlier IIAs, for instance in respect to access to inves-
tor-state arbitration for the settlement of disputes.17 This Essay will describe 
generally the approaches of BITs to the regulation and protection of foreign 
investment.  
Although originating from the practice of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation (“FCN”) Treaties,18 BITs are the result of the severance between 
trade and investment as a result of the multilateralization of international 
trade through the signature of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”).19 Because of the multilateralization of international trade, the 
specific protection afforded to foreign investors was left unregulated at the 
international treaty level, paving the way for the contemporary regulation of 
foreign investment through bilateral investment treaties.20 But, significantly, 
the protection of foreign investment is not the objective of a treaty. Rather, 
the objective of a treaty is broader and more philanthropic as it involves the 
promotion of foreign investment and capital flows between two or more 
States and the economic development of States.21 The investment protection 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See International Investment Agreements Navigator, INV. POLICY HUB, UNCTAD, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA [https://perma.cc/8XTA-WANY] (summarizing the bilateral 
investment treaties and treaties with investment provisions as of Oct. 1, 2018). 
 17 Compare Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and U.S. Dep’t of State, 2012 U.S. Mod-
el Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 23–36, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20
for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZQK-QZF9] [hereinafter 2012 U.S. Model 
BIT] (containing fourteen articles relating to investor–State dispute settlements), with Treaty Con-
cerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Arg.-U.S., art. VII, Nov. 14, 
1991, 31 I.L.M. 124 (containing only one article involving investor–State dispute settlements). 
 18 See Todd S. Shenkin, Trade-Related Investment Measure in Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and the GATT: Moving Toward a Multilateral Investment Treaty, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 541, 548–49 
(1994) (providing an overview of the Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties (“FCN”) 
and BIT practice, specifically regarding the United States). 
 19 Alizera Falsafi, Regional Trade and Investment Agreements: Liberalizing Investment in a 
Preferential Climate, 36 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 43, 46 (2008). 
 20 See Sergio Puig, The Merging of International Trade and Investment Law, 33 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 1, 8–11 (2015) (explaining how international trade regulation developed in contrast to 
international investment law). 
 21 See SALACUSE, supra note 8, at 191 (explaining the “promotion” aspect of investment 
treaties). 
2018] (Re)Calibration of Investment Law and Arbitration 2613 
provisions and the access to arbitration for foreign investors usually provid-
ed in IIAs are merely a means to achieve this goal. While the general objec-
tives of stimulating capital flows and attracting foreign capital—viewed 
from the perspective of the host State—may nowadays seem somewhat re-
mote, it is nonetheless in the DNA of IIAs. The remoteness between the 
overarching objective and the practical reality that IIAs are mainly used for 
investment protection is understandable, since many IIAs bear as title, 
“Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment.”22  Although 
implying a double objective: promotion and protection, in practice the vast 
majority of IIAs contain mainly investment protection provisions.23  
A. Investment Protection Standards in Investment Treaties 
IIAs mainly provide for the protection of foreign investment.24 The 
majority of investment treaties contain relatively similar standards or norms 
geared towards such protection, some of which have their origin in custom-
ary norms dating back to the the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century.25 Most contemporary treaties require investors and investments to 
be accorded FET, full protection and security (“FPS”), national treatment 
(“NT”) and most favoured nation treatment (“MFN”), prohibit direct and 
indirect expropriations unless certain strict conditions are met.26 These trea-
                                                                                                                           
 22 See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investment between the Republic of Austria and the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
Austria–Nigeria, Aug. 8, 2013, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2972 
[https://perma.cc/WV22-V4R8]. 
 23 There are several IIAs that not only have “promotion” of investment as an overarching 
objective, but also have specific provisions aimed at the promotion. See Agreement on Encour-
agement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Arg.-Neth., art. 2, Oct. 20, 1992, 2242 
U.N.T.S. 205, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/107 [https://perma.cc/
PR6B-3CE4] (“Either Contracting Party shall, within the framework of its laws and regulations, 
promote economic cooperation through the protection in its territory of investment of investors of 
the other Contracting Party. Subject to its right to exercise powers conferred by its laws or regula-
tions, each Contracting Party shall admit such investments.”). 
 24 See SALACUSE, supra note 8, at 191 (describing the various steps states take to govern 
foreign investment). 
 25 See generally Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agree-
ments, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. OF INT’L L. & POL’Y 157 (2005) (providing a historical overview of IIAs). 
 26 See generally Andrea K. Bjorklund, National Treatment, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT 
PROTECTION 29 (August Reinisch ed., 2008) [hereinafter STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTEC-
TION] (discussing national treatment); Giuditta Cordero Moss, Full Protection and Security, in 
STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION, supra, at 131 (analysing the full protection and securi-
ty standard in investment arbitration); Anne K. Hoffmann, Indirect Expropriation, in STANDARDS 
OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION, supra, at 151 (discussing expropriation); Katia Yannaca-Small, 
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent Developments, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT 
PROTECTION, supra, at 111 (providing a discussion on fair and equitable treatment (“FET”)); 
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ties also contain clauses related to transfer of funds, transparency, and com-
pensation for losses owing to war, armed conflict, revolution, a state of na-
tional emergency, and other exceptional circumstances.27 Alongside protec-
tion standards, investment treaties very often contain direct access for for-
eign investors to international arbitration with certain variations as to the 
conditions under which such access can be effectuated.28 
A central question is: how are protection standards and access to arbitra-
tion, and the specific contours of these defined in IIAs? The starting point for 
the protection offered to foreign investors can be found in certain customary 
norms. In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century there were 
multiple cases that applied the customary norms concerning the protection of 
aliens under international law, and notably the so-called international mini-
mum standard (“IMS”) and the standard of full protection and security 
(“FPS”).29 In 1926, the US/Mexico General Claims Commission issued its 
decision in L. F. H. Neer & Pauline Neer v. United Mexican States, which has 
since been often quoted as representing the international minimum standard.30 
The US/Mexico General Claims Commission described the IMS as follows: 
[T]he propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of 
international standards, and (second) that the treatment of an al-
ien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should 
amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to 
                                                                                                                           
Andreas R. Ziegler, Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) Treatment, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT 
PROTECTION, supra, at 59 (exploring most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment). 
 27 See generally Abba Kolo & Thomas Wälde, Capital Transfer Restrictions Under Modern 
Investment Treaties, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION, supra note 26, at 205 (provid-
ing a discussion on the transfer of funds); Facundo Pérez-Aznar, Investment Protection in Excep-
tional Situations: Compensation-for-Losses Clauses in IIAs, 32 ICSID REV.–FOREIGN INV. L.J. 
696 (2017) (providing a discussion on compensation for losses clauses). 
 28 See, e.g., Model Text for the Canadian Bilateral Investment Treaty; Model Text for the 
Chile Bilateral Investment Treaty; Model Text for the France Bilateral Investment Treaty; Model 
Text for the South Africa Bilateral Investment Treaty, Model Text for the Switzerland Bilateral 
Investment Treaty; Model Text for the United Kingdom Bilateral Investment Treaty; Model Text 
for the United States Bilateral Investment Treaty, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/
IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu [https://perma.cc/G7PX-YB3B] (providing links to the model BITs; 
to open the relevant BIT, select the state concerned, and then under ‘Investment Related Instru-
ments (IRIs),’ locate the specific model BIT). 
 29 See d’Aspremont, supra note 4, at 10–11 (discussing the origin and the debate surrounding 
international minimum standards); see also Eric De Brabandere, Host States’ Due Diligence Obli-
gations in International Investment Law, 42 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 319, 324–25 (2015) 
[hereinafter De Brabandere, Host States’ Due Diligence Obligations] (describing how “many 
cases” confirm the obligations States have with regard to an alien’s property). 
 30 This is not, however, without controversy with respect to the application of that decision to 
modern investment law. See ROLAND KLÄGER, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT IN INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 51–53 (2011) (discussing further the controversy with respect to the 
application of that decision to modern investment law). 
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an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of interna-
tional standards that every reasonable and impartial man would 
readily recognize its insufficiency. Whether the insufficiency pro-
ceeds from deficient execution of an intelligent law or from the 
fact that the laws of the country do not empower the authorities to 
measure up to international standards is immaterial.31 
The duty to protect the security of aliens and their property from acts of the 
State or of third parties in their territory also has long been accepted in in-
ternational law.32 One finds references to such a standard in many cases, 
notably in the decisions of several Claims Commissions established in the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century.33 Additionally, the rules in 
relation to expropriation, and especially the conditions under which a lawful 
expropriation can occur, currently found in the vast majority of contempo-
rary IIAs, can be traced back to a customary norm in this respect.34 
Irrespective of their “source” origin, some of these norms, and other 
norms currently included in IIAs find their origins in other regulatory regimes 
in international law, such as international trade law. I am not targeting the use 
of analogies derived from other regimes which bare similarity—normative or 
systemic—with investment law,35 but rather the incorporation of such norms 
and rules from other regimes in IIAs. An example is MFN, which has tradi-
tionally been included in international trade agreements,36 and the inclusion 
                                                                                                                           
 31 L.F.H. Neer & Pauline Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 60, 61–62 (Gen. 
Cl. Comm’n 1926). 
 32 Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International 
Responsibility of States, 35 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 9, 24–25 (1992); see De Brabandere, Host 
States’ Due Diligence Obligations, supra note 29, at 319–61 (explaining the framework of arbitral 
tribunal decisions that have applied the due diligence standard in international investment law). 
 33 E.g., H.G. Venable (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 219 (Gen. Cl. Comm’n 
1927); George Adams Kennedy (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, Concurring opinion by Amer-
ican Comm’r, 4 R.I.A.A. 194 (Gen. Cl. Comm’n 1927); Laura M. B. Janes et al. (U.S.A.) v. Unit-
ed Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 82 (Gen. Cl. Comm’n 1925); Home Frontier and Foreign Mission-
ary Soc’y of the United Brethren in Christ (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.), 6 R.I.A.A. 42 (Gr. Brit. U.S. Mixed 
Comm’n 1920); Sambiaggio Case (It. v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 499, 524 (Mixed Cl. Comm’n, 
1903); see Pisillo–Mazzeschi, supra note 32, at 27–28 (providing a general overview of the vari-
ous case law to this effect). 
 34 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), ¶ 4 (Dec. 14, 1962) (providing the U.N.’s Declaration on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources). See generally Eli Lauterpacht, Issues of Com-
pensation and Nationality in the Taking of Energy Investments, 8 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES 
L. 241 (1990) (noting that “under customary international law . . . ‘appropriate’ compensation 
[must] be paid”). 
 35 Martins Paparinskis, Analogies and Other Regimes of International Law, in THE FOUNDA-
TIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 73–107 (Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn & Jorge 
E. Viñuales eds., 2014) [hereinafter THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW].  
 36 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Most-Favoured-Nation Treat-
ment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, at 1, 9–12, U.N. Doc. 
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of which discloses, as said before, the FCN Treaties origin of contemporary 
investment treaties. The same can be said in relation to national treatment.37 
More recently, one sees the inclusion of norms relating to labour standards, 
human rights, and the environment. This inclusion is a consequence of the 
incorporation, of general international law norms or norms from specific sub-
-fields of international law, such as international human rights law and inter-
national environmental law in investment law and IIAs.38 
When looking to some of the recent (re)calibration exercises in relation 
to specific issues in the field of international investment law and arbitration, 
the position of international investment law will thus be primordial. Viewing 
international investment law as a field within public international law, facili-
tates the incorporation of international law standards and norms that are, in 
principle or in origin, alien to the regulation of foreign investment sensu stric-
to. On the contrary, a focus on the private dimension of investment law, or the 
specific features of the system will result in the impenetrability of interna-
tional investment law from any generalist international law influence, but not 
from other contract or private law rules and practices.39  
B. Access to Arbitration Under Investment Treaties 
Turning to the settlement of investment disputes under IIAs—the pro-
cedural side of investment law—one can clearly detect the origins of the 
current inclusion of investment treaty arbitration in IIAs. The standing of 
individuals and corporations in international investment arbitration is in-
spired mainly by a perceived fear of lack of independence of domestic 
courts and tribunals40 and the ineffectiveness of the customary system of 
diplomatic protection.41 To avoid the rather cumbersome and uncertain pro-
                                                                                                                           
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/1 (Nov. 2010), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia20101_en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6JC2-94NF]. 
 37 See Mark Wu, The Scope and Limits of Trade’s Influence in Shaping the Evolving Interna-
tional Investment Regime, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra 
note 35, at 169–209 (providing an overview of trade and investment regimes, and describing the 
interaction between these two regimes). 
 38 See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 17, arts. 12–13 (including the environment in 
Article 12, and labour in Article 13). 
39 It is interesting to note that the (re)calibration of investment law and arbitration, if ground-
ed in external norms and rules, takes place more in the framework of public international law 
rather than commercial law or private law. 
 40 CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 61–63 (2d ed., 2017) (discussing the 
limited jurisdiction of arbitration tribunals, and providing an example in which a judge noted that 
one of the goals of BITs was to address any uneasiness a party may have in local courts). 
 41 See ERIC DE BRABANDERE, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS & IMPLICATIONS 60 (2014). 
2018] (Re)Calibration of Investment Law and Arbitration 2617 
cedure of diplomatic protection, investment treaties habitually grant inves-
tors the right to bring directly a claim against the host State before an inter-
national arbitration tribunal.42 Investor access to investment treaty arbitra-
tion is, simply put, the withdrawal of the procedural barriers imposed by the 
rules on diplomatic protection through the explicit consent by States.  This 
then allows the foreign investor of one State to bring a claim directly 
against another State without the former State’s intervention. 
The method used to settle international investment disputes in IIAs—
investment treaty arbitration—is modelled on the rules and principles of 
international commercial arbitration.43 International commercial arbitration 
and investment treaty arbitration share many common features.44 Many of 
these common features are moreover inherent to the very concept of arbitra-
tion. Via both mechanisms, parties decide to bring a claim before a party-
appointed panel of arbitrators and in principle define the applicable law and 
the procedural rules. Likewise, the conduct of the proceedings is influenced 
by the common principles of arbitral procedures, such as those governing 
the constitution of the tribunal, the challenge of arbitrators, and the rules in 
respect of the rendering to the final award.45 
The way in which the arbitration of investment disputes under IIAs is 
perceived and treated is of particular importance for the way in which pro-
cedural questions are dealt with by arbitral tribunals and in IIAs. In contrast 
to investment protections standards, investment treaty arbitration is, in prac-
tice, heavily influenced by whether one considers the public or private di-
mension of the arbitral proceedings to be predominant or to provide a better 
explanatory or regulatory framework for settling investor-State disputes. 
The consideration one picks will influence the way in which the procedure 
is shaped in practice and in theory.46  
                                                                                                                           
 42 See id. at 21. 
 43 Inspiration was also sought in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration 1962 Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation for Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes Between Two Parties of Which Only One Is a State, notably in the creation of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). See Antonio R. Parra, The 
Development of the Regulations and Rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, 41 INT’L LAW. 47, 49, 55–57 (2007) (describing the ICSID Convention’s inaugural 
meeting where the provisional rules and regulations were drafted, and additional amendments to 
the ICSID rules and regulations); see also Sergio Puig, No Right Without a Remedy: Foundations 
of Investor-State Arbitration, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra 
note 35, at 235 (contextualizing the signing of the ICSID). 
 44 See DE BRABANDERE, supra note 41, at 4–7. 
 45 Id. 
 46 It is not a coincidence that the modification of arbitration rules to incorporate transparency-
related rules occurred because of the State or public perspective behind such modifications. See id. 
at 148 (providing an overview and discussion of the modification of arbitration rules and the poli-
cies behind such modifications). Nor is it surprising that the differentiation made between invest-
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II. REDEFINING INVESTMENT PROTECTION STANDARDS  
IN INVESTMENT TREATIES 
A. Fair and Equitable Treatment in Investment Treaties 
The obligation to treat foreign investors fairly and equitably is stipulated 
in the vast majority of BITs and in some regional or sectoral multilateral in-
vestment agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”) or the Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”).47 In a passage which has 
been repeatedly quoted by subsequent tribunals,48 the tribunal in Teccnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States explained that the 
fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard “requires the Contracting Parties 
to provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the basic 
expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the 
investment”.49 More recently, the tribunal in Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret 
Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan stated that: 
[T]he different factors which emerge from decisions of investment 
tribunals as forming part of the FET standard. . . . [C]omprise the 
obligation to act transparently and grant due process, to refrain 
from taking arbitrary or discriminatory measures, from exercising 
coercion or from frustrating the investor’s reasonable expectations 
with respect to the legal framework affecting the investment.50 
                                                                                                                           
ment treaty arbitration and regular commercial arbitration is used to justify, for example, the au-
thority for arbitral tribunals to accept amicus curiae briefs. See, e.g., Methanex Corp. v. United 
States, Decision on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as ‘Amici Curiae,’ ¶ 32 (Jan. 15, 
2001), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0517_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WNN5-39H2] [hereinafter Methanex Decision]. 
 47 Eric De Brabandere, States’ Reassertion of Control over International Investment Law: 
(Re)Defining ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ and ‘Indirect Expropriation,’ in REASSERTION OF 
CONTROL OVER THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME  285 (Andreas Kulick ed., 2017) [hereinafter 
De Brabandere, States’ Reassertion of Control over International Investment Law] (citing Roland 
Kläger, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinnings of Legitimacy 
and Fairness, 11 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 435, 436 (2010)). This section and the next section 
draws partly on Prof. De Brabandere’s research previously published in States’ Reassertion of 
Control over International Investment Law, supra. 
 48 See, e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, 
Decision on Annulment Award, ¶ 298 (Sept. 28, 2007) (quoting Técnicas Medioambientales Tec-
med S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 
2003)).  
 49 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003). 
 50 Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, ¶ 178 (Aug. 27, 2009). 
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The FET standard is a flexible and rather vague concept. Therefore, the fram-
ing and labelling of the different sub-elements continue to vary considerably 
and are heavily influenced by arbitral jurisprudence.  Based on the abovemen-
tioned cases and scholarship, it is generally accepted that the following obli-
gations form part of fair and equitable treatment: observance of the investor’s 
legitimate expectations, non-discrimination, proportionality, due process, 
transparency, freedom from coercion and harassment, stability, predictability, 
and a general duty of due diligence.51 The two most important components of 
FET in practice are the requirement of a certain form of legal stability, and 
the protection of the legitimate expectation of foreign investors.52 Yet, in the 
practice of arbitral tribunals there is a tendency to a more cautious approach 
to FET. This is evidenced through the recognition of the States’ right to regu-
late and thus for States to maintain sufficient regulatory space.53  
The question whether FET exists as a self-contained standard54 or 
whether it is merely a rebadged version of the international minimum 
standard (“IMS”)55 is still subject to much debate. Recently, tribunals have 
considered the FET to be the “new” customary minimum standard of treat-
ment,56 but it is clear that outside the treaty and arbitral practice it is diffi-
cult to find evidence of such a new customary standard. Commentators sug-
gest the evolving nature of the IMS appears well established today, and 
seems to have evolved to the point where the current arbitral jurisprudence 
has refused to discern any practical difference between the interpretation of 
FET in line with the evolved minimum standard and the application of FET 
as a self-contained norm.57 
                                                                                                                           
 51 ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 277–79 (Kluwer Law Int’l ed., 2009); see Yannaca-Small, supra 
note 26, at 118 (providing an overview of the contents of the standard in function of arbitral prac-
tice). 
 52 See Yannaca-Small, supra note 26, at 121–26. 
 53 See Ursula Kriebaum, FET and Expropriation in the (Invisible) EU Model BIT, 15 J. 
WORLD INV. & TRADE 454, 471 (2014) (noting the overall trend towards a “cautious approach” to 
the FET standard through “stress[ing] the need for States to maintain regulatory space”). 
 54 See generally Christoph Schreuer, Full Protection and Security, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLE-
MENT 353 (2010) (discussing the debate surrounding the FET). 
 55 Kläger, supra note 47, at 436–38. 
 56 See Bilcon of Del. Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04, 
Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 432–433 (Mar. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Bilcon Award] (de-
scribing how NAFTA Article 1105 incorporates fair and equitable treatment, and that it is “identi-
cal to the minimum international standard”); see also Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada, 
ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, Award, ¶ 210 (Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter Merrill Award] (noting 
that fair and equitable treatment of aliens has become “sufficiently part of widespread and con-
sistent practice” such that it is now “reflected . . . in customary international law”). 
 57 Kläger, supra note 47, at 439. 
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B. Causes, Concerns and the Recalibration of FET 
The contemporary meaning of the FET standard rests heavily on the 
interpretations by the arbitral tribunals tasked with settling disputes between 
foreign investors and host States in relation to that standard of treatment. 
This, in essence, is the result of the often general and vague formulations of 
the FET standard, which leaves much room for expansive interpretations by 
tribunals of what constitutes “unfair and inequitable” treatment. 
In relation to the FET standard, two issues have triggered specific State 
reactions. First, the minimalist58 and open–ended formulations of FET in 
investment treaties has resulted in an interpretation of the FET standard that 
includes a vast variety of sub-categories or elements. Certain States consid-
er this result as going beyond their original intention. The inclusion, nota-
bly, of the requirement of a stable legal framework59 and the extensive reli-
ance on the legitimate expectations of the foreign investor,60 has been the 
subject of much criticism over the past years.61 
The second issue, which is very much the consequence of the first, is 
the expansive interpretation of FET provisions, which has resulted from 
tribunals’ purely semantic approaches to defining what constitutes “unfair 
and inequitable” treatment. Because of the vagueness of the standard and 
the lack of precise guidance on how to interpret the standard—apart from 
the IIAs’ preambles—tribunals consider on a case-by-case basis whether the 
treatment accorded to the foreign investor is “unfair” and/or “inequitable.”62 
Such a semantic approach and the resulting expansive interpretation of what 
                                                                                                                           
 58 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Fair and Equitable Treatment–
UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, at 1, 11, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5 (Feb. 2012) [hereinafter Fair and Equitable Treatment] (explaining 
the broad interpretation of the FED standard has created an unbalanced and open-ended approach 
to arbitral awards). 
 59 See Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, 
Final Award, ¶ 183 (July 1, 2004) (noting that “[t]he stability of the legal and business framework 
is thus an essential element of fair and equitable treatment”); see also CMS Gas Transmission Co. 
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 274 (May 12, 2005) (noting that, in 
order to maintain fair and equitable treatment, there must be a “stable framework for invest-
ments”). 
 60 See, e.g., Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶¶ 301–302 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
Mar. 17, 2006) (noting how fair and equitable treatment is “closely tied” to legitimate expectations 
of the foreign investor). 
 61 See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/19, Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken, ¶¶ 21–29 (July 30, 2010) 
(explaining the “legitimate expectations” element). See generally Moshe Hirsch, Between Fair 
and Equitable Treatment and Stabilization Clause: Stable Legal Environment and Regulatory 
Change in International Investment Law, 12 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 783 (2011). 
 62 See Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 58, at 10 (noting the “open-ended nature of 
the FET standard”). 
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constitutes “fair and equitable treatment,” while not necessarily contrary to 
the rules on treaty interpretation, has nevertheless resulted in a clear tenden-
cy to restrict the scope of the FET provision and clearly define the standard 
“without leaving unwelcome discretion to arbitrators.”63 More generally, an 
impression underlying the criticism of FET is that the State’s right to regu-
late has been unduly restricted because the legitimate regulatory acts of the 
State was found to be in breach of the FET standard or of another provision 
prohibiting indirect expropriations.64 
In an attempt to reduce the concerns expressed in the previous section, 
there are various strategies States have adopted and can adopt relating to 
both their future and existing FET and indirect expropriation provisions.65 
One of these options consists of States redefining and reformulating the 
specific contents and formulations of FET and the prohibition of indirect 
expropriation. Although it is also clear that the inclusion of FET as a norm 
of investment protection is not a mandatory “standard” of investment trea-
ties since recent treaty practice has shown that States can sign investment 
treaties without any FET clause,66 the basis on which redefinition or refor-
mulation has taken and is taking place hinges on—roughly—two justifica-
tions of what the FET standard should be. 
First, certain States have re-emphasised the customary nature of the 
standard, and hence have tried to make clear that FET is not a standard that 
is broader than the customary international law standard of treatment. This 
is an attempt to objectivize FET and provide legitimacy to the inclusion of 
such a standard in IIAs. Consequently, FET is included in IIAs simply be-
cause this is what international law requires from host States towards for-
eign investors. Certain States have linked the content of FET to internation-
al law or to an international customary norm.67 To link FET to the IMS 
                                                                                                                           
 63 Commission Concept Paper on Investment in TTIP and Beyond—The Path for Reform, at 2, 
(May 12, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF [https://perma.
cc/Q8H2-EXVU] [hereinafter Commission Concept Paper]. 
 64 See id. (noting that the stakeholders have a right to regulate, and expressing concern over 
FET abuse). 
 65 See generally De Brabandere, States’ Reassertion of Control over International Investment 
Law, supra note 47 (examining FET and indirect expropriation). 
 66See, e.g., Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty 2015, https://mygov.in/
sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Invest
ment%20Treaty.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FA8-BQXL] [hereinafter 2015 Indian Model BIT] (con-
taining no mention of FET). 
 67 See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 
art. 2, Bahr.–U.S., Sept. 29, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. No. 106-25, https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/43479.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EK8-289G] (linking FET to customary international 
law); Decret n° 96-914 du 9 octobre 1996 portant publication de l’accord entre le Gouvernement 
de la Republique Française et le Gouvernement de la Republique d’ Albanie sur l’encouragement 
et la protection reciproques des investissements [Decree No. 96-914 of 9 October 1996 Establish-
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found in customary international law, with the further clarification that FET 
under international law requires nothing more than the IMS narrows the 
scope of the standard. It also indirectly gives content to FET and removes 
the possibility of applying a semantic methodology to identify the content 
of the standard. But this leaves open the question of the precise content of 
the customary norm and the usual problems accompanying the formation 
and identification of custom. 
It is in this context that the aforementioned NAFTA Free Trade Com-
mission’s interpretative note on the FET standard needs to be viewed.68 
NAFTA’s response to the FET standard’s interpretation is highlighted be-
cause NAFTA’s preferred interpretation of the FET standard has found its 
way into a number of other model and actual BITs, notably the 2012 U.S. 
Model BIT, as well as the 2004 Canadian Model BIT.69 This language dom-
                                                                                                                           
ing Publication of the Agreement Between the Government of the French Republic and the Re-
public of Albania on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments], art. 3, June 
13, 1995, J.O., 18 Oct. 1996, p. 15273, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/Treaty
File/13 [https://perma.cc/A55D-VDR8]; 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 17, art. 5 (linking FET 
to international customary law). 
 68 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1105(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 
32 I.L.M. 289, 639 [hereinafter NAFTA] (stipulating that “[e]ach Party shall accord to invest-
ments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair 
and equitable treatment and full protection and security”). Arbitral tribunals that have dealt with 
that provision in the early stages of NAFTA investment disputes gave different interpretations of 
the NAFTA’s FET provision. In order to clarify the interpretation of Article 1105(1), the NAFTA 
Free Trade Commission (“FTC”) issued a binding interpretation on July 21, 2001, which provides:  
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to invest-
ments of investors of another Party. 
2. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” 
do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the cus-
tomary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens. 
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, 
or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a 
breach of Article 1105(1). 
FTC Interpretation of Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA (July 15, 2001), https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/38790.pdf [https://perma.cc/97RN-YGJ8]. 
 69 See 2004 Canadian Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 
5, www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/E595-G742] 
[hereinafter 2004 Canadian Model BIT] (providing the phrase, “[e]ach Party shall accord to cov-
ered investments treatment in accordance with the customary international law minimum standard 
of treatment of aliens, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security”); 
2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 17, art. 5 (including the phrase, “[e]ach Party shall accord to 
investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including 
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security”). 
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inated various other treaties involving non-NAFTA States.70 Such clauses, 
viewed in the context of recent arbitral jurisprudence, no longer are effec-
tive in achieving both the limitation of the content of FET and the attempts 
to limit the discretion tribunals otherwise would have in interpreting the 
standard. Indeed, certain tribunals have considered the FET to be the “new” 
customary minimum standard of treatment,71 and in doing so have simply 
bypassed the narrowing down of FET attempted by the States which adopt-
ed such a formulation.72 
A second and more voluntarist approach to redefining FET is in large 
part not linked to any particular pre-set standard in international law. What-
ever one considers as the customary norm, the international minimum 
standard could hardly be considered a peremptory norm in international 
law. States have the liberty to offer more or less protection to foreign inves-
tors in their treaties. The policy implications of such a choice are of course 
important, as are the practical implications in case of a dispute between for-
eign investors and host States based on the violation of FET. But, outside of 
the above–mentioned example, redefinitions or reformulations of FET, are 
difficult to evaluate as a matter of consistency or not being in line with 
“the” standard in investment law. 
This voluntarist approach can be exemplified by the recent attempts to 
rethink investor protection under the FET standard in treaties signed and ne-
gotiated by the European Union.73 Because of the unsettled and multi–
threaded aspect of the FET standard, there is an increasing tendency by States 
to narrow the ambit of FET. The most recent treaties show a clear tendency 
by States to move away from open-ended formulations of FET clauses to 
formulations by which the specific content of what constitutes FET is explic-
itly included. A recent example is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 58, at 25 (noting which non-NAFTA coun-
tries have included the language of the NAFTA FTC’s Note into its IIAs). 
 71 Bilcon Award, supra note 56, ¶ 422; see Merrill Award, supra note 56, ¶ 210 (describing 
how fair and equitable treatment is in international customary law “today”). 
 72 See Matthew C. Porterfield, A Distinction Without a Difference? The Interpretation of Fair 
and Equitable Treatment Under Customary International Law by Investment Tribunals, INV. 
TREATY NEWS (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.iisd.org/itn/es/2013/03/22/a-distinction-without-a-
difference-the-interpretation-of-fair-and-equitable-treatment-under-customary-international-law-
by-investment-tribunals/ [https://perma.cc/RXX2-AUES] (providing solutions to avoid potentially 
overly broad interpretations of the FET). 
 73 At the same time, one should keep in mind that many newly signed treaties still very much 
stick to the “old” formulations. European States for instance still use the generic FET (and indirect 
expropriation clauses) discussed above in their bilateral treaties. See Kriebaum, supra note 53, at 
454. 
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Agreement (“CETA”) between Canada and the E.U.74 Article 8.10 of CETA 
enumerates the types of measures that can constitute a breach of FET.75 The 
list contains many elements which are usually considered part of FET, yet 
notably absent from the list is the “stability” element, which as noted, has 
been considered problematic. Another notable absence is the “legitimate ex-
pectation” element which is also a highly-criticized FET component.76 
The clause clearly is a reaction to what the European Commission has 
termed “abuses.”77 The “shift” away from traditional European BITs is a 
                                                                                                                           
 74 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., Oct. 30, 2016 (provisionally 
entered into force Sept. 21, 2017), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_
152806.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9HE-K9HY] [hereinafter CETA]. 
 75 CETA, art. 8.10 provides: 
1. Each Party shall accord in its territory to covered investments of the other Party 
and to investors with respect to their covered investments fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security in accordance with paragraphs 2 
through 6. 
2. A Party breaches the obligation of fair and equitable treatment referenced in para-
graph 1 if a measure or series of measures constitutes: 
  a) denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; 
  b) fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamental breach of trans-
parency, in judicial and administrative proceedings; 
  c) manifest arbitrariness; 
  d) targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race 
or religious belief; 
  e) abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and harassment; or 
  f) a breach of any further elements of the fair and equitable treatment obligation 
adopted by the Parties in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article. 
Id.  
 76 Nevertheless, Article 8.10(4) of CETA provides that: 
When applying the above fair and equitable treatment obligation, a Tribunal may 
take into account whether a Party made a specific representation to an investor to 
induce a covered investment, that created a legitimate expectation, and upon which 
the investor relied in deciding to make or maintain the covered investment, but that 
the Party subsequently frustrated. 
Id. The “legitimate expectations” component of FET is thus abandoned as a “core” element of FET 
and relegated to a mere potential or subsidiary issue the arbitral tribunal may consider in assessing 
whether FET, as defined, in the previous paragraphs has been breached. See id.  
 77 Commission Concept Paper, supra note 63, at 2; see Patrick Dumberry, Drafting the Fair 
and Equitable Treatment Clause in the TPP and RCEP: Lessons Learned from the NAFTA Article 
1105 Experience, 12 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 22 (2015) (noting how NAFTA tribunals con-
sidered transparency and legitimate expectations as “factors”). See generally Elizabeth Boomer, 
Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities in Investor–State Dispute Settlement: Some Model Interna-
tional Investment Agreement Provisions, 11 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1 (2015) (proposing lan-
guage for a model BIT); Zhang Wenjuan, Will Greater Specificity with Respect to the Fair and 
Equitable Treatment Obligation Lead to Greater Predictability in Investment Treaty Cases?, 12 
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1 (2015) (arguing for more specific language in BITs to ensure con-
sistent treatment in tribunals). 
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clear and conscious political and policy decision of the European Commis-
sion made based—mainly—on the general criticism of international in-
vestment law and arbitration and the broadness of the protection offered to 
foreign investors, notably following what the E.U. considered to be over-
broad interpretations of FET by arbitral tribunals. The (re)calibration exer-
cise in this particular situation has taken place not necessarily at the level of 
setting a new FET standard in light of the customary international law 
standard, but rather in light of what the E.U. and Canada considered to be 
politically, economically and policy-wise justifiable and “necessary.” It may 
of course well be that inspiration was sought in what the negotiators consid-
ered to be the “customary law” standard of FET, but, contrasted to the prac-
tice of NAFTA, for example, it is remarkable that no reference to “interna-
tional law” has been added in the CETA FET provision. It would thus seem 
that there was not a deliberate choice to include a standard of treatment be-
cause such standard is part of customary law. This may also have been a 
deliberate move to counter certain case-law, which considered the FET def-
inition in older IIAs to be the “new” customary minimum standard of treat-
ment,78 in order to avoid broad interpretations of the FET standard.79 
III. FOREIGN INVESTOR OBLIGATIONS IN INVESTMENT  
LAW AND INVESTMENT TREATIES 
A second area in which (re)calibration has recently occurred relates to 
the obligations of foreign investors, notably in the areas of human rights, 
labour standards, and the protection of the environment. The interconnect-
edness between human rights and international investment law and arbitra-
tion is a relatively recent field of enquiry, both on the academic and policy 
levels. At the same time, the (relatively) recent attention given to the human 
rights aspects of foreign investment in the specific context of international 
investment law and arbitration and the inclusion of specific provisions in 
IIAs to that effect has to be seen as being on a continuum with the broader 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Bilcon Award, supra note 56, ¶ 433; see Merrill Award, supra note 56, ¶ 210 (identifying 
fair and equitable treatment as part of international customary law “today”).  
 79 The most recent version of the FET provision in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership contains a similar—yet not completely identical—provision. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce: 
Chapter II, art. 3 (Nov. 12, 2015) http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_
153955.pdf [https://perma.cc/NX3N-UHFL]. A similar provision was also included in the final 
draft of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) accepted in November 2015. See Trans-Pacific Part-
nership, annex 9–A, Feb. 4, 2016 (no longer in effect), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-
Final-Text-Investment.pdf [https://perma.cc/SV7A-62LM]. 
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“corporate social responsibility” debate which takes place in a larger con-
text than solely investment law.  
The question of whether corporations and foreign investors have any 
obligations under international human rights law is a relatively old debate in 
international law and international relations.80 Since the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, numerous avenues for increasing the accountability of 
corporations were explored in the legal literature, and several international 
instruments were adopted in an effort to regulate the conduct of non-State 
actors, in particular, the conduct of transnational corporations in the human 
rights sphere.81 But the transition from that debate to the obligations of for-
eign investors in IIAs is relatively new. 
This evolution is in many respects interesting and perhaps remarkable 
as it implies the incorporation of IIAs and international investment law of 
norms and rules, typically discussed in a different context. Foreign direct 
investment and human rights seem to be relatively separate fields of inter-
national law. Traditionally, international investment treaties were silent on 
issues of human rights. The main multilateral investment treaties, NAFTA 
and ECT, to name but a few, make no mention of human rights.82 Although 
States have recently and effectively included references to human rights 
norms in their IIAs, the vast majority of contemporary BITs do not mention 
human rights. While human rights obligations for foreign investors are only 
rarely included in investment treaties themselves, there are several recent 
examples of investment treaties containing clauses which refer to the obli-
gations of foreign investors in the area of human rights.83 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See Eric De Brabandere, Non-State Actors, State-Centrism and Human Rights Obligations, 
22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 191 (2009) (discussing whether corporations and foreign investors have 
obligations under human rights law). 
 81 See Eric De Brabandere & Maryse Hazelzet, Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights—
Navigating Between International, Domestic and Self-Regulation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Yannick Radi ed., forthcoming Dec. 
2018) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2913616 [https://perma.cc/TMJ9-MD7S] 
(providing a discussion about the debate and proposed solutions concerning how to hold international 
corporations responsible). 
 82 See generally NAFTA, supra note 68 (providing no mention of human rights); Energy 
Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100 (failing to mention human rights). 
 83 The idea of incorporating, in an investment treaty, references to human rights obligations of 
foreign investors, or more broadly corporate social responsibility, is not new. A notable attempt to do 
so was the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (“MAI”), proposed by the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”). The draft of the now defunct MAI contained a 
provision which was based on the “association” of the treaty with the OECD Guidelines on Multina-
tional Enterprises to that agreement. See Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], The Multilat-
eral Agreement on Investment: Draft Consolidated Text, § X, DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1 (Apr. 22, 
1998), http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf [https://perma.cc/25MS-XZ39] (noting 
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Several treaties incorporated foreign investors’ human rights obliga-
tions through clauses that contain obligations for States to “encourage” in-
vestors operating in their territory to voluntarily comply with corporation 
social responsibility (“CSR”) standards, including human rights.84 There are 
however, more recent types of clauses that contain clear references to obli-
gations of foreign investors. The following examples, which remain rela-
tively limited in number compared to the bulk of existing investment trea-
ties,85 show a gradual inclusion and further refinement of provisions relat-
ing to the human rights obligations of foreign investors. 
Article 15.1 of the 2012 Model BIT of the Southern African Develop-
ment Community (“SADC”) establishes the duty for investors, “to respect 
human rights in the workplace and in the community and State in which 
they are located” and further provides that:  
Investors and their investments shall not undertake or cause to 
be undertaken acts that breach such human rights. Investors and 
their investments shall not assist in, or be complicit in, the vio-
lation of the human rights by others in the Host State, including 
by public authorities or during civil strife.”86 A more specific 
provision in relation to the labour standards is also included87 
which prohibits investors from operating their investment . . . in 
a manner inconsistent with international environmental, labour, 
and human rights obligations binding on the Host State or the 
Home State, whichever obligations are higher.88 
These provisions were incorporated and further specified in the recently 
negotiated Draft Pan–African Investment Code (“PAIC”). The draft has not 
                                                                                                                           
that the “[g]uidelines are part of the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multination-
al Enterprises of 21 June 1976 as amended”). 
 84 See, e.g., Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Peru, art. 810, May 29, 2008, http://
international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/peru-perou/
fta-ale/08.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/XZT3-47GP]. 
 85 See, e.g., Makane Moïse Mbengue & Stefanie Schacherer, The ‘Africanization’ of Interna-
tional Investment Law: The Pan-African Investment Code and the Reform of the International In-
vestment Regime, 18 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 414, 435 (2017) (discussing various treaties). 
 86 S. AFR. DEV. CMTY., SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with Commentary, 
art. 15.1, July 2012, www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-Model-BIT-Template-
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3YL-3CMF]. 
 87 Id. art. 15.2. 
 88 Id. art. 15.3. 
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been adopted yet, nor has it been used in practice.89 The draft text contains 
not less than six provisions dealing with investor obligations. Besides provi-
sions dealing with corporate governance obligation of investors, socio–
political obligations, bribery, and the use of natural resources90, two provi-
sions deal with human rights obligations of foreign investors in particular. 
Article 22 of the PAIC entitled, “Corporate Social Responsibility” provides, 
amongst others, an obligation for foreign investors to “abide by the laws, reg-
ulations, administrative guidelines and policies of the host State.” Article 24 
in turn deals with “Business Ethics and Human rights” and sets several prin-
ciples that “should govern compliance by investors with business ethics and 
human rights . . . .” 
India also recently adopted a similar approach in its 2016 Model 
BIT.91 The model treaty has not been used in practice yet either, but it con-
tains several articles which comprise, in more detail, the obligations of for-
eign investors. Article 12 of the treaty contains a general obligation for for-
eign investors to respect the domestic laws of the host State and a non–
exhaustive list of more specific legislation, such as labour laws, and legisla-
tion relating to human rights.92 Article 13 is quite unique, and relates to the 
responsibility of the home State of the investor and the mandatory submis-
sion of civil liability actions against the investor in its home State for “acts, 
decisions or omissions made in the Home State in relation to the Investment 
where such acts, decisions or omissions lead to significant damage, personal 
injuries or loss of life in the Host State.”93 The home State of the investor in 
turn, is to “ensure that their legal systems and rules allow for, or do not pre-
vent or unduly restrict, the bringing of court actions on their merits before 
their domestic courts” for such civil liability actions.94 This clause is in line 
with the possibility for States, based on their legislative authority, to adopt 
legislation to regulate the extraterritorial activities of their nationals—both 
physical and legal persons. It departs from the general rule however, that 
the possibility under general international law is transformed into a treaty 
obligation. 
These examples mainly show that IIAs are undergoing a transfor-
mation from the original purpose of promoting and protecting foreign in-
                                                                                                                           
 89 Moreover, not much information on the negotiation of the draft is publicly available, with 
the exception of the March 2016 draft text. See generally U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Africa, Draft 
Pan-African Inv. Code, U.N. Doc. E/ECA/COE/35/18 (Mar. 26, 2016). 
 90 Id. arts. 19–21, 23. 
 91 See generally 2015 Indian Model BIT, supra note 66. 
 92 Id. art. 12.1(i)(v). 
 93 Id. art. 13.1. 
 94 Id. art. 13.2. 
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vestment to broader regulatory instruments governing the protection of for-
eign investment and the general activities of foreign investors in host States. 
It will be important to see whether this evolution will be sustained in the 
years to come. This (re)calibration is not completely unsurprising from a 
general international law perspective since corporate social responsibility 
and the obligations of corporations in the area of human rights more gener-
ally has long since been on the international agenda. The norms in relation 
to corporate social responsibility—binding or not—were set years ago out-
side of the formal context of international investment law.95 While perhaps 
at first difficult to reconcile with the original idea behind IIAs, such an evo-
lution can be seen from the perspective that international investment law 
and IIAs operate within a general international law framework. It nonetheless 
shows that the way in which international treaties are currently being redraft-
ed is set against, not only the typical norms that were included in such treaties 
over the past decades, but more importantly by reference to standards which 
have been set in a different context within international law. 
IV. TRANSPARENCY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 
A third area that recently underwent an evolution from a procedural per-
spective, is the transparency of investment treaty arbitration. The evolution 
has been visible for more than a decade and resulted in a now almost univer-
sal (re)calibration of the way in which arbitral proceedings are conducted in 
investment treaty arbitration. This is evidenced by the modification in 2006 of 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) Ar-
bitration Rules96 and the adoption in July 2013 of specific rules on “transpar-
ency in treaty-based investor–State arbitration” by UNCITRAL,97that have 
now been incorporated in the Mauritius Convention.98 It is to be noted that it 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See generally Peter Muchlinski, Human Rights, Social Responsibility and the Regulation of 
International Business: The Development of International Standards by Intergovernmental Or-
ganisations, 3 NON-ST. ACTORS & INT’L L. 123 (2003) (examining the norms of international 
investment law in relation to corporation social responsibility). 
 96 See generally Aurélia Antonietti, The 2006 Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regula-
tions and the Additional Facility Rules, 21 ICSID REV.–FOREIGN INV. L.J. 427 (2006) (discussing 
the modifications to the ICSID Rules and Regulations). 
 97See Press Release, United Nations Information Service, UNCITRAL Adopts Transparency 
Rules for Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration and Amends the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
(July 12, 2013) (reporting UNCITRAL’s adoption of specific rules); see also U.N. Comm’n on 
Int’l Trade L., Rep. of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the Work of its Fifty-
Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/765, art. 1 (2013) (discussing UNCITRAL’s incorporation of 
transparency rules into its Arbitration Rules). 
 98 G.A. Res. 69/116, United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-
State Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/68/496 (Oct. 18, 2017) http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/116 [https://perma.cc/AC45-2T6V]. 
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is precisely and only for treaty-based investment arbitration that the new 
UNCITRAL rules have been adopted, as the title indicates, which shows that 
the treaty foundation of investment treaty arbitration has heavily influenced 
the adoption of these rules. More recently, both the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (“SCC”), and the Singapore International 
Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) amended their arbitration rules to accommodate 
the possibility for third parties to make amicus curiae submissions.99 SIAC 
developed and adopted a specific set of procedural rules for “investment arbi-
tration” (SIAC Investment Arbitration Rules).100 Appendix III (entitled “In-
vestment Treaty Disputes”) to the SCC Arbitration Rules also contains the 
procedure for amicus curiae submissions.101 Contrary to the ICSID Arbitra-
tion Rules and the SIAC Investment Arbitration Rules, Appendix III of the 
SCC Arbitration Rules applies only to treaty–based investment arbitrations.102 
This example illustrates how external standards have through incorpo-
ration resulted in a new standard in investment arbitration. Traditionally, 
international commercial arbitration is conducted in a relatively103 confiden-
tial and private manner, even in the absence of an explicit confidentiality 
provision in the arbitration agreement. Neither the existence of a dispute, 
nor the procedural details of the settlement of the dispute are made public; 
nor is any access of non–disputing parties to the proceedings. The majority 
of the arbitration rules provide that awards may not be published without 
the parties’ agreement,104 and even in the absence of such explicit rules, it is 
accepted that proceedings are conducted in a confidential way.105 
                                                                                                                           
 99 See generally DE BRABANDERE, supra note 41. 
 100 See generally 2017 Investment Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration 
Centre (Jan. 2017), http://siac.org.sg/images/stories/articles/rules/IA/SIAC%20Investment%20
Arbitration%20Rules%20-%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FYM-GUS5]. 
 101 See 2017 Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce, app. III, art. 3 (Jan. 2017), https://sccinstitute.com/media/293614/arbitration_rules_
eng_17_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA7U-WMLU] [hereinafter SCC Arbitration Rules] (describ-
ing how third parties “may apply” to submit arguments in an ongoing arbitration). 
 102 See id. app. III, art. 1 (providing that scope is limited to claims “based on a treaty”). 
 103 See Alberto Malatesta, Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration, in THE 
RISE OF TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE CASE FOR THE ANONYMOUS 
PUBLICATION OF ARBITRAL AWARDS 39, 42 (Alberto Malatesta & Rinaldo Sali eds., 2013) [here-
inafter THE RISE OF TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION]. 
 104 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as Revised in 2010, G.A. Res 65/22, U.N. Doc 
A/RES/65/22, art. 34(5) (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-
rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5CZ-CMBQ] (“An award may be 
made public with the consent of all parties . . . .”). 
 105 Paolo Comoglio & Chiara Roncarolo, Presenting the Guidelines for the Publication of 
Arbitral Awards: Aiming to the Circulation of a Solid Arbitral Case Law, in THE RISE OF TRANS-
PARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 103, at 1–2. 
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For various reasons, investment treaty arbitration has departed from 
the commercial arbitration principles of privacy and confidentiality.106 Most 
importantly, the public international law character of investment treaty arbi-
tration has been used to differentiate it from international commercial arbi-
tration. The fact that the questions put to an investment tribunal generally 
concern State’s international legal obligations and that the acts complained 
of relate to issues of general public interest, such as environmental legisla-
tion, labour standards, or other social and economic rights, militates in fa-
vour of both transparency of and non-party access to the proceedings.107 
These features of investment arbitration stand in sharp contrast to dispute 
settlement in international commercial arbitration. The use of the method of 
international commercial arbitration to settle investment disputes which 
have a public international law character naturally results in a certain ten-
sion between the public international law nature of the dispute—because 
such disputes are concerned with the assessment of a State’s exercise of its 
sovereign powers under international law, and the private character of the 
dispute settlement method. It is precisely in tempering this tension that the 
pendulum will move to one or the other side depending only on a pre-
determined conception of whether investment treaty arbitration is or should 
be public and/or private. 
The gradual move towards transparency first occurred almost two dec-
ades ago by arbitral tribunals that were “forced” to take a stance on certain 
issues relating to transparency through the submission of amicus curiae 
briefs by—mainly—NGOs. In 2001, in the ground–breaking Methanex 
Corp. v. United States decision,108 a NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitral Tribunal 
operating under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules concluded that it had the 
power to accept amicus curiae briefs. It found this power by referring to the 
case law of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal and the cases before the WTO. 
The Tribunal noted that Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
gave the Tribunal broad discretion in terms of procedural rules.109 It is im-
                                                                                                                           
 106 See DE BRABANDERE, supra note 41, at 149–53. 
 107 See Christina Knahr & August Reinisch, Transparency Versus Confidentiality in Internation-
al Investment Arbitration—The Biwater Gauff Compromise, 6 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 
97, 113 (2007) (noting how investment tribunals work akin to a “judicial review” on government 
actions, and as such can address environmental and health concerns); see also Meg Kinnear, Eloïse 
Obadia & Michael Gagain, The ICSID Approach to Publication of Information in Investor-State 
Arbitration, in THE RISE OF TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 107, supra note 103, 
at 107–08 (noting that tribunals consider different elements when their decisions “affect[] public 
interest”). 
 108 Methanex Decision, supra note 46, ¶ 32 (interpreting UNCITRAL Arbitration rules in the 
context of NAFTA Chapter 11). 
 109 See id. ¶¶ 29–32 (discussing the scope of article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules). 
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portant to point out that the Tribunal in Methanex invoked the need for 
greater transparency and supported its conclusion relating to the “public 
interest” the authority for the tribunals to receive NGO submissions.110 
Since Methanex, States have, through the NAFTA Free Trade Com-
mission, issued a statement confirming that no provision in NAFTA limits 
the discretionary authority or arbitral tribunals to accept submissions of 
non–disputing parties.111 This has been followed by the inclusion of trans-
parency rules in IIAs112 and finally in arbitration rules, as mentioned above. 
The foundation for moving to transparency is inhibited by the position-
ing of investment treaty arbitration within the broader public international 
law sphere. Before this evolution in investment treaty arbitration, other dis-
pute settlement bodies had already adopted rules and a policy of transparen-
cy. For example, NGO participation in proceedings through the submission 
of briefs was raised before and accepted by the WTO dispute settlement 
bodies in the Shrimp-Turtles dispute in 1998.113 In this report, the WTO 
Appellate Body argued that there is no rule in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding that prohibits panels from accepting information voluntarily 
submitted to it.114 At the same time, it should also be noted that transparen-
cy sensu lato of international inter-State proceedings is not a fully accepted 
principle. For instance, the International Court of Justice and even interna-
tional inter-State arbitration, while being transparent in the sense of allow-
ing the general public access to information about the cases on its docket, 
including access to decisions and memorials, have traditionally been closed 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See id. ¶ 49 (noting that the implications of the case extend beyond the parties, and that the 
“arbitral process could benefit from being perceived as more open and transparent”). 
 111 Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation, ¶ A.1 
(Oct. 7, 2003), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/
Nondisputing-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/U89R-4W2U]. 
 112 See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 17; 2004 Canadian Model BIT, supra note 69; 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative & U.S. Dep’t of State, 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaty, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4VA-
XSZP].  
 113 See generally Appellate Body Report, U.S – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998). 
 114 See id. ¶ 108 (noting that the panel may consider information regardless of “whether [it 
was] requested by the panel or not”). As far as the submission of amicus curiae briefs to the Ap-
pellate Body itself is concerned, the Appellate Body decided in a subsequent case that it had, rela-
tively similarly to the panels, the authority to accept and consider amicus curiae briefs if it finds it 
“pertinent and useful to do so.” Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Imposition of Countervailing Du-
ties on Certain Hot–Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the U.K., 
¶ 42, WTO Doc. WT/DS138/AB/R (adopted May 10, 2000); see also Appellate Body Report, 
European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 52, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Mar. 12, 2001) (describing the additional procedure in 
accepting third party submissions). 
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in relation to amicus curiae submission.115 The standard used to then make 
investment treaty arbitration more transparent is not based on a similar 
standard being applied in other international law proceedings. Rather, it is a 
combination of these international rules and practices combined with con-
siderations related to the public nature of the dispute at stake. In that sense, 
the (re)calibration of investment treaty arbitrations has its foundation in 
standards imported from public law more generally.116 
CONCLUSION 
Contemporary discussions of the adjustments made to various norms 
and principles of investment law and arbitration can benefit from an ap-
praisal from the perspective of calibration rather than balancing. In compar-
ison to balancing, calibration has the benefit of looking to the reasons be-
hind adjustments to investment law and arbitration. Looking into what 
standards are used to compare or evaluate where the current investment law 
regime comes from and what these standards are, acknowledges the current 
exercise in (re)calibrating international investment law and arbitration. 
These standards provide an explanatory framework to understand these 
changes and enables one to better place the limits of the debate on whether 
international investment law and arbitration should move in one or the other 
direction. 
Specifically, in relation to FET, the “shift” away from traditional Euro-
pean IIAs was a conscious political and policy decision, notably following 
what the European Union considered to be over–broad interpretations of 
FET by arbitral tribunals. Setting a new FET standard in light of the cus-
tomary international law standard has not been explicit, as is noticeable 
from the absence of any reference to international law in the definition of 
FET. 
Regarding investor obligations IIAs current transformation and 
(re)calibration evidences that the way in which international treaties are cur-
rently being redrafted is made by reference to standards which have been 
set in a different context within international law. 
Finally, the move to transparency is arguably inhibited by the position 
of investment treaty arbitration within the broader public international law 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See Eric De Brabandere, NGOs and the “Public Interest”: The Legality and Rationale of 
Amicus Curiae Interventions in International Economic and Investment Disputes, 12 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 85, 91–93 (2011) (discussing submissions by NGOs to the International Court of Justice). 
 116 Alessandra Asteriti & Christian J. Tams, Transparency and Representation of the Public 
Interest in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARA-
TIVE PUBLIC LAW 787 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010). 
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sphere. While the standard of transparency outside of the formal investment 
law regime is not entirely set as it is in investment treaty arbitration, espe-
cially in relation to amicus curiae briefs, the openness and public access to 
information regarding the procedures has clearly been drawn from other 
inter-state litigation mechanisms. 
Although there is no general standard to which investment treaties 
should conform, political, economic, and policy standards outside of any 
legal constraints of course continue to play an important role in shaping 
investment treaties. 
